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Military Capabilities: From Pooling & Sharing 
to a Permanent and Structured Approach 
Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont 
In 2013 the European Council for the first 
time  since  long  will  deal  with  European 
defence. An excellent opportunity: to move 
key  Pooling  &  Sharing  projects  to  the 
implementation stage in the short term, and 
to  launch  a  permanent  and  structured 
approach to the development of European 
military capabilities for the long term. 
In this time of crisis the European Council has 
emerged  as  the  place  in  the  European 
construction where one can hope to get things 
done,  through  direct  talks  at  the  highest 
political level. For the first time since long the 
Heads of State and Government will now also 
address European defence, at the end of 2013:   
“The European Council should also look at 
defence,  in  particular  the  development  of 
European military capabilities. A changing 
strategic  environment,  constraints  on 
defence  budgets  and  the  Lisbon  Treaty's 
explicit call for advances in the Common 
Security  and  Defence  Policy,  all  point  to 
the  need  for  a  longer-term  and  more 
systematic cooperation in this area. An in-
depth  discussion  could  take  place  in  the 
second  half  of  2013.  It  should  take  into 
account links to industrial policy, research 
& innovation and the internal market.”  
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This  is  good  news.  The  problems  of 
Europe’s military are known, the solutions are 
known. More meetings of officials and experts 
will not bring much progress. The only way to 
now  get  results  is  to  make  the  process  more 
political and top-down. An opportunity not to 
be wasted therefore: now is the time to design 
a roadmap leading up to December 2013.  
 
MAINTAINING MOMENTUM  
First of all the December 2013 deadline should 
be put to use to maintain the momentum in 
Pooling & Sharing.  
 
In December 2011, the process led to the 
identification  by  the  Council  of  11  “specific 
concrete”  projects,  including  on  air-to-air 
refuelling,  smart  munitions,  intelligence, 
surveillance  and  reconnaissance  including 
space  situational  awareness,  and  military 
satellite  communications.  These  would  go  a 
long way to address some of the key shortfalls 
qua  strategic  enablers  –  if  they  are 
implemented.  While  there  has  been  some 
progress since, notably on air-to-air refuelling, 
the fundamental challenge remains to recruit a 
critical  mass  of  Member  States  for  each  of 
these projects to really take off and generate 
significant additional capability. December 2013 
should be announced as the key deadline.   
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France  and  the  UK,  the  leading  military 
actors  in  Europe,  have  a  direct  interest  in 
convincing the other Member States to invest 
in collective enablers. Paris and London have 
the weight to initiate projects to create strategic 
enablers, the lack of which they have just felt 
again  in  Libya.  But  to  make  projects 
economically and financially viable, they need 
contributions  from  the  other  capitals.  Vice 
versa,  if  the  other  capitals  want  to  remain 
militarily  relevant  and  retain  the  capacity  to 
deploy their forces, they need these enablers as 
much as Paris and London. Of course, when 
Member  States  are  cutting  national  defence 
budgets, asking them to simultaneously invest 
in a multinational capability is not an easy sell. 
The  role  of  the  European  Defence  Agency 
(EDA) can be to point out, from its European 
perspective,  where  Member  States  can  safely 
disinvest  nationally  in  favour  of  these 
multinational projects.  
 
One avenue that deserves more exploration 
is  cooperation  with  the  Commission.  Many 
enabling  capabilities  are  of  a  dual-use  nature. 
Pooling and sharing not just between Member 
States but with the Commission as well might 
greatly enhance the financial feasibility of some 
of the projects.  
 
CHANGING THE MIND-SET  
In  order  to  keep  Pooling  &  Sharing  going, 
short-term  progress  on  the  11  projects  is 
essential. Member States will only be convinced 
though  if  they  subscribe  to  a  long-term 
framework for European defence, of which the 
current projects are but one (important) step. 
For  these  projects  do  not  address  all  of  the 
gaps qua strategic enablers. And there is more 
to  European  defence  than  strategic  enablers. 
The  challenge  also  remains  to  create  more 
deployable  manoeuvre  units  (and  thus  to  get 
real value for money from the defence budget), 
and  to  update  or  replace  platforms  (without 
increasing the defence budget). The December 
2013  European  Council  should  also  be  used 
therefore  to  lay  the  groundwork  for  a 
systematic  long-term  approach  to  Pooling  & 
Sharing.  
 
The  aim  is  strategic-level  coordination,  of 
national  defence  planning  as  a  whole,  to 
complement the existing tactical-level, project-
by-project coordination. That can only happen 
in a top-down manner. Not in the sense that 
Brussels  dictates  the  Member  States  what  to 
do, but in the sense that Heads of State and 
Government collectively decide on a political 
process.  A p r o c e s s  of  which  they  maintain 
ownership and supervision, which is essential 
for the sustained involvement of the Heads of 
State  and  Government  and  for  swift 
implementation  by  each  national  defence 
establishment. A process also which is not only 
to safeguard sovereignty but even to restore it 
where  at  the  individual  national  level  it  has 
been  lost.  Those  who  have  the  authority  to 
kick off such a process (with an agreement on 
principles  and  short  but  clear  overall 
guidelines)  are  the  Heads  of  State  and 
Government.  
 
A  permanent  and  structured  dialogue  on 
national defence planning as such, under the 
aegis  of  the  European  Council,  will  create 
transparency, trust and confidence. And when 
Member  States a r e  certain  of e a c h  o t h e r ’s 
intentions, they can confidently decide:  
- To focus their national defence effort on 
a  reduced  range  of  fully  employable 
capabilities; 
- To scrap redundant capabilities;  
- To use the full potential for Pooling & 
Sharing  that  will  rapidly  emerge  from 
their dialogue; 
- In  order  to  create  budgetary  space  to 
invest  in  the  major  new  collective 
projects to acquire strategic enablers.  
 
This dialogue can be supported by a formal 
group within the EDA structures. The key is to 
involve  high-level  representatives  (the  actual 
decision-makers)  from  Member  States,  be  it 
the  Defence  Policy  Director,  the  National   3 
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Armaments Director, the General Procurement 
Officer o r  equivalent:  those  who  effectively 
steer  national  capability  decisions.  Ideally  the 
dialogue includes all Member States, but it can 
certainly  start  with  a  group  of  the  able  and 
willing – willing to change their mind-set.  
 
LEADING THE WAY TO 2013  
Who can launch this permanent and structured 
framework? As it is to be a dialogue between 
Member States, Member States have to initiate 
it.  The  initiative  should  not  come  from  the 
Franco-British,  Weimar,  Nordic,  Visegrad  or 
Benelux group. The aim is not only to deepen 
Pooling  &  Sharing  within  established  clusters 
like these, but also to generate an overview at 
the  level  above  individual  clusters,  at  which 
those  projects  can  be  launched  that  surpass 
their  capacity.  A  group  of  Member  States 
cutting across these clusters would be optimal 
therefore.  
 
Such  a  group  could  announce  its 
commitment  to  launch  a  permanent  and 
structured  dialogue  between  its  members, 
which  can  be  formalized  by t h e  E u r o p e a n  
Council. At any one moment it should be open 
to any other Member State willing to subscribe 
to its principles.  
 
Such  a  group  could  notably  propose  the 
following:  
(1) Member  States  should  systematically 
engage in a dialogue about national defence 
planning, in order to continuously update 
each other about plans and intentions s o 
that  all  would  have  the  complete  picture 
(whereas now in reality not all information 
is being shared, in spite of commitments to 
that  end,  e.g.  in  the  context  of  the 
Capability Development Plan). When at the 
national  level  a  formal  white  book  or 
similar  is  being  drafted,  fellow  Member 
States and the EDA can be consulted all 
along the process.  
 
(2) Furthermore,  Member  States  should 
systematically  submit  national  defence 
planning and white books to the EDA for 
an  informal  assessment  in  the  light  of 
Pooling  &  Sharing  opportunities  and  the 
focus on commonly identified shortfalls.  
 
(3) They  should  convene  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment  to  consider  capability 
intentions  post-2025.  The  immediate 
challenge  today  is  to  coordinate  national 
cuts  in  existing  capabilities  and  in  future 
capabilities that are already under contract. 
The  budgetary  margin  of  manoeuvre  is 
very limited. But now is the time to start 
discussing the capabilities that collectively we 
want to have in 10 to 15 years and beyond, 
in  order  to  generate  those  in  a  collective 
fashion from the very start.  
 
(4) Member States could commit to spend 
a  fix  percentage  of  annual  defence 
investment  via  the  EDA,  in  function 
notably  of  these  long-term  capability 
intentions.  The  resulting  funds  could  be 
jointly administered by the group.  
 
(5) In  view  of  the  EU’s  comprehensive 
approach  and  the  links  between  internal 
and external security, a systematic dialogue 
with the Commission is essential, notably 
about dual-use capabilities. The EDA and 
the High Representative, its Head, are well 
placed  to  ensure  such  coordination. 
Pooling  &  Sharing  with  the  Commission 
should be part of the new mind-set.  
 
(6) Ideally,  Member  States  would  ground 
their reflection on the long-term capability 
mix in a broader strategic reflection about 
Europe’s  level  of  ambition  as  a  security 
provider. For which regions and types of 
crises will Europeans assume responsibility 
as  a  matter  of  priority?  Which  types  and 
quantity of capabilities do we want to have 
to that end? At the very least, we should 
think through the concrete and immediate 
capability  implications  of  the  American   4   
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“pivot”  to  the  Asia-Pacific.  Which 
contingencies  for  which  until  now  we 
counted  on  American  support  are  we 
henceforth expected to deal with ourselves? 
In  our  increasingly  volatile  neighbourhood 
this may happen sooner than expected.  
 
The  EDA  itself  can  greatly  contribute  to 
overall  transparency  by  publishing  a  publicly 
available  yearbook  on  European  capabilities. 
Rather than a collection of figures submitted by 
Member States (which as the NATO experience 
shows  capitals  do  not  necessarily  believe 
themselves), the yearbook would be written by 
the  EDA,  focusing  on  commonly  identified 
shortfalls,  on  employable  capabilities,  on 
potential  solutions  and  projects,  and  on  good 
examples of Pooling & Sharing.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The  planned  European  Council  meeting  on 
defence  should  serve  both  as  a  deadline  to 
stimulate concrete progress on specific projects 
in the short term, which is necessary to keep the 
dynamic going, and as a moment to chart the 
strategic course for the future.  
 
On  the  one  hand,  the  European  Council 
should take stock of implementation of the 11 
projects prioritized in December 2011. On the 
other  hand,  it  could  formally  launch  a 
permanent  and  structured  approach  for 
European defence in the long term, prepared by 
and  under  the  clear  ownership  of  Member 
States. Launching the framework could go hand 
in  hand  with  a  tasking,  e.g.  to  prioritize  and 
translate  into  project  proposals  capability 
intentions post-2025, especially with regard to 
strategic enablers.  
 
Another  tasking,  to  a  group  of  Member 
States or to a panel of personalities, could be 
to draft strategic guidelines and priorities for 
Europe’s  level  of  ambition.  Capability 
development  should  not  take  place  in  a 
strategic void, but should be firmly anchored 
in a collective vision on what Europeans want 
to  achieve  as  security  providers.  Pooling  & 
Sharing also applies to strategy.  
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